Abstract
In Anti-Individualism and Knowledge Jessica Brown criticises views of content that combine Fregean Sense and anti-individualism. Brown assumes that all Fregean theories are motivated by a picture of the rational thinker as someone who will always have transparent access to the simple inferential consequences of his thoughts. This picture, Brown argues, is incompatible with anti-individualism about content. While traditional Fregean theories have indeed had such motivation, Brown’s mistake is in attributing this motivation to the modern Fregean anti-individualist. My goal in this paper is to bring to light a different, and seldom discussed, motivation for Fregean views of content which is immune to Browns objections.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Grazer Philosophische Studien |
| Vol/bind | 94 |
| Udgave nummer | 1-2 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 153-172 |
| Antal sider | 20 |
| ISSN | 0165-9227 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 2017 |
| Udgivet eksternt | Ja |
Emneord
- Anti-individualism
- Fregean content
- Truth
- Demonstrative thought
- Externalism