What Motivates Fregean Anti-individualism?

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Abstract

In Anti-Individualism and Knowledge Jessica Brown criticises views of content that combine Fregean Sense and anti-individualism. Brown assumes that all Fregean theories are motivated by a picture of the rational thinker as someone who will always have transparent access to the simple inferential consequences of his thoughts. This picture, Brown argues, is incompatible with anti-individualism about content. While traditional Fregean theories have indeed had such motivation, Brown’s mistake is in attributing this motivation to the modern Fregean anti-individualist. My goal in this paper is to bring to light a different, and seldom discussed, motivation for Fregean views of content which is immune to Browns objections.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftGrazer Philosophische Studien
Vol/bind94
Udgave nummer1-2
Sider (fra-til)153-172
Antal sider20
ISSN0165-9227
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2017
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Anti-individualism
  • Fregean content
  • Truth
  • Demonstrative thought
  • Externalism

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