Understanding Ownership: Residual Rights of Control and Appropriable Control Rights

    Publikation: Working paperForskning

    14 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstrakt

    We discuss the notion of ownership in economics, taking our point of departure in the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach. We criticize the exclusive identification of ownership with residual rights to control in this approach, and argue that economic organization may be rendered determinate under complete contracting (contrary to the GHM approach). Crucially, we argue that under complete contracting, some control rights may be appropriable because of measurement and enforcement costs. This holds the key to a theory of ownership that is not dependent on the notion of residual rights to control, but rather relies on appropriable control rights. However, the two perspectives may be complementary rather than rival.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    UdgivelsesstedKøbenhavn
    UdgiverDRUID - Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics
    Antal sider29
    ISBN (Trykt)8778730457
    StatusUdgivet - mar. 1999
    NavnDRUID Working Paper
    Nummer99-4

    Bibliografisk note

    Opstilling: 330.341 fos
    Løbe nr.: 992922

    Emneord

    • Theory of the firm
    • Property rights

    Citationsformater