Transnational Veto Players and the Practice of Financial Reform

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

    Resumé

    Policy processes in transnational settings are shaped by actors whose approval and consent are required for reform to take place. These ‘transnational veto players’ frame and delimit policy options. The concept of ‘transnational veto players’ is developed through an empirical analysis of global reforms in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions deemed ‘too big to fail’. Actors debating and developing policy on ‘too big to fail’ may have formal defined constituencies, as regulators, academics or lobbying organisations, but in their transnational interactions they are also informed by a diffuse constituency of peers through their multiple associations within policy communities. These interactions determine which policy ideas are permissible and how they are adopted. The ‘too big to fail’ case shows how reform activity to curtail the risks posed by large financial institutions may also inadvertently strengthen their position as transnational veto players
    Policy processes in transnational settings are shaped by actors whose approval and consent are required for reform to take place. These ‘transnational veto players’ frame and delimit policy options. The concept of ‘transnational veto players’ is developed through an empirical analysis of global reforms in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions deemed ‘too big to fail’. Actors debating and developing policy on ‘too big to fail’ may have formal defined constituencies, as regulators, academics or lobbying organisations, but in their transnational interactions they are also informed by a diffuse constituency of peers through their multiple associations within policy communities. These interactions determine which policy ideas are permissible and how they are adopted. The ‘too big to fail’ case shows how reform activity to curtail the risks posed by large financial institutions may also inadvertently strengthen their position as transnational veto players
    SprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftThe British Journal of Politics and International Relations
    Vol/bind17
    Udgave nummer2
    Sider318-334
    Antal sider17
    ISSN1369-1481
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 2015

    Emneord

    • Financial reform
    • Global banking
    • Too big to fail
    • Veto Players

    Citer dette

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    Transnational Veto Players and the Practice of Financial Reform. / Tsingou, Eleni.

    I: The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Bind 17, Nr. 2, 2015, s. 318-334.

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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