The Power of Non-Controlling Stake

Below Parity Representation of Employees on Corporate Boards

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

Resumé

We discuss the potential for below-parity employee representation in the board of directors by analyzing the workers’ choice to adopt this mechanism of employee voice when employee board representation is optional and employees are granted only a minor share of board seats. Combining the stakeholder and institutional theory we reason that, under shareholder supremacy, the effectiveness of this mechanism and, consequently, the utility that the employees gain from board representation will be higher when workers hold firm-specific human capital, and in the presence of institutions that legitimize employees’ voice and consequently corroborate their influence on board. We conjecture how these factors vary with region, firm and worker characteristics. We test our propositions using the Danish employer-employee linked data for public and private firms.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdatojun. 2017
Antal sider46
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jun. 2017
BegivenhedThe 3rd Annual ICGS Conference: Balancing Value Creation with Stakeholder Accountability - Luiss University, Rome, Italien
Varighed: 2 sep. 20173 sep. 2017
Konferencens nummer: 3
https://icgsociety.org/conferences/past-conferences/

Konference

KonferenceThe 3rd Annual ICGS Conference
Nummer3
LokationLuiss University
LandItalien
ByRome
Periode02/09/201703/09/2017
Internetadresse

Emneord

  • Boards
  • Voice
  • Employee representation
  • Codetermination
  • Family firms

Citer dette

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The Power of Non-Controlling Stake : Below Parity Representation of Employees on Corporate Boards. / Gregoric, Aleksandra; Poulsen, Thomas.

2017. Afhandling præsenteret på The 3rd Annual ICGS Conference, Rome, Italien.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

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