The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Resumé

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal standard of proof in crim-inal law. It is assumed that people in society care about both fairness and deterrence. It is important to punish those who are guilty and only those. However, error is unavoidable and hence a trade-o¤ emerges between the three aims of punishing the guilty, not punishing the innocent and deterring potential criminals. It is shown that when only deterrence matters the op-timal standard of proof is a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard (given some other assumptions) while if fairness is an issue the standard will gen-erally be stricter and involve Bayesian up-dating. When both fairness and deterrence matter the standard of proof will (generally) lie in between the two standards. An example illustrates how the model might be applied in practice to determine the optimal standard of proof for a given crime.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelses stedFrederiksberg
UdgiverInstitut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School
Antal sider32
ISBN (Trykt)8790705416
StatusUdgivet - 2000
NavnWorking Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School
Nummer2000-7
ISSN0903-0352

Emneord

  • Retssager
  • Strafferet
  • Bevis

Citer dette

Lando, H. (2000). The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter. Frederiksberg: Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School. Working Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School, Nr. 2000-7
Lando, Henrik. / The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter. Frederiksberg : Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School, 2000. (Working Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School; Nr. 2000-7).
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Lando, H 2000 'The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter' Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg.

The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter. / Lando, Henrik.

Frederiksberg : Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School, 2000.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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Lando H. The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter. Frederiksberg: Institut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School. 2000.