The Governance of Industrial Foundations: Executive and Director Turnover

    Publikation: Working paperForskning

    Abstrakt

    We study turnover among executives and directors in companies owned by Danish industrial foundations, which are held to be long term owners. Executives are members of the management board (direktionen), whereas directors a members of the supervisiory board (bestyrelsen). As expected, we find that both director and executive turnover is lower in foundation-owned companies. Foundation-owned companies are more likely to replace directors, but not executives, when performance is bad (negative profits). Thus, we find some evidence of long-termism in foundation-owned companies.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    Udgivelses stedFrederiksberg
    UdgiverCenter for Corporate Governance. Department of International Economics and Management. Copenhagen Business School
    Antal sider17
    StatusUdgivet - 2 jun. 2014

    Bibliografisk note

    Tidligere version af papiret blev præsenteret på et seminar ved Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 1. december 2013

    Citationsformater

    Børsting, C., Kuhn, J., Poulsen, T., & Thomsen, S. (2014). The Governance of Industrial Foundations: Executive and Director Turnover. Frederiksberg: Center for Corporate Governance. Department of International Economics and Management. Copenhagen Business School.