Temporary Partnerships as an Information Transmission Mechanism

H. Peter Møllgaard, Per Baltzer Overgaard

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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Abstrakt

Asymmetric information and fear of acquiring a 'lemon' may explain the paucity of foreign investment in emerging market economies. If investors are uncertain about the profitability of investments, intrinsically inefficient, temporary partnerships or joint ventures may serve as mechanisms through which information is transmitted. Temporary partnerships with joint investments by the domestic firm and the foreign investor, together with a buy-out option to the investor, can be used to separate good and bad investment prospects in equilibrium. However, non-revealing equilibria may exist. Implications for foreign direct investment are traced and briefly related to the experience of transition economies.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelses stedCopenhagen
UdgiverDepartment of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Antal sider25
StatusUdgivet - 1998
NavnWorking Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Nummer10-98
NavnDiscussion Papers / Department of Economics. University of Copenhagen
Nummer98-13
ISSN1601-2461

Emneord

  • Investment
  • Complementary assets
  • Partnerships
  • Joint ventures and licensing
  • Costly signaling

Citationsformater

Møllgaard, H. P., & Overgaard, P. B. (1998). Temporary Partnerships as an Information Transmission Mechanism. Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School. Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School, Nr. 10-98, Discussion Papers / Department of Economics. University of Copenhagen, Nr. 98-13