Abstract
Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, we examine the effect of technological competition over a patent on the firm's choice of patenting strategy. We claim that technological competition makes the traditional strategy of protecting focal innovations from imitation less likely and increases the likelihood of a play strategy — i.e. using patents to avoid the risk of hold-up by other patent owners, or as a bargaining chip in litigation and cross-licensing. However, we claim also that technological competition over a target close to the firm's core technology should lead to use of a fence strategy i.e. to blocking the commercial endeavors of rivals and preempting substitute inventions. We find support for our hypotheses using data from a large-scale survey of European patent applications.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Artikelnummer | 104785 |
Tidsskrift | Research Policy |
Vol/bind | 52 |
Udgave nummer | 6 |
Antal sider | 14 |
ISSN | 0048-7333 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - jul. 2023 |
Emneord
- Technological competition
- Intellectual property management
- Patent strategy
- Appropriability