Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Records

Alice Guerra, Tobias M. Hlobil

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Resumé

Traditional economic models of accident law are static and assume homogeneous individuals under perfect information. This paper relaxes these assumptions and presents a dynamic unilateral accident model in which potential injurers differ in their probability of accident. Information about individual risk-type is hidden from the social planner and from each potential injurer. We ask how negligence standards should be optimally tailored to individual risk-type when this is imperfectly observable. We argue that information about past accident experiences helps to efficiently define negligence standards, narrowing the distance between first-best standards perfectly tailored to individual risk-type and third-best averaged standards. We finally show that negligence standards refined on the basis of past accident experiences and of individual risk-type do not undermine private incentives to undertake due care.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelses stedMünchen
UdgiverMunich Personal RePEc Archive
Antal sider16
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 10 aug. 2015
Udgivet eksterntJa
NavnMPRA Paper
Nummer66281

Emneord

  • Accident law
  • Individualized negligence standards
  • Negligence
  • Bayesian updating rule

Citer dette

Guerra, A., & Hlobil, T. M. (2015). Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Records. München: Munich Personal RePEc Archive. MPRA Paper, Nr. 66281 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2650823
Guerra, Alice ; Hlobil, Tobias M. / Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Records. München : Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2015. (MPRA Paper; Nr. 66281).
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Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Records. / Guerra, Alice; Hlobil, Tobias M.

München : Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2015.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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KW - Bayesian updating rule

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Guerra A, Hlobil TM. Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Records. München: Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 2015 aug 10. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2650823