Subjective Bayesian Beliefs

Constantinos Antoniou, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, Daniel Read

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Abstrakt

A large literature suggests that many individuals do not apply Bayes’ Rule when making decisions that depend on them correctly pooling prior information and sample data. We replicate and extend a classic experimental study of Bayesian updating from psychology, employing the methods of experimental economics, with careful controls for the confounding effects of risk aversion. Our results show that risk aversion significantly alters inferences on deviations from Bayes’ Rule.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Risk and Uncertainty
Vol/bind50
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)35-54
Antal sider20
ISSN0895-5646
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2015

Emneord

  • Bayes’ Rule
  • Subjective beliefs
  • Learning

Citationsformater