Strategy-proof Assignment of Multiple Resources

Albin Erlanson*, Karol Flores-Szwagrzak

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. In the domain of multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof, unanimous, consistent, and resource-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Young, 1987), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Economic Theory
Vol/bind159
Udgave nummerPART A
Sider (fra-til)137-162
Antal sider26
ISSN0022-0531
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 1 sep. 2015
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Strategy-proofness
  • Consistency
  • Resource-monotonicity

Citationsformater