Strategic Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions with Capacity Constrained Bidders

The New York Capacity Market

Sebastian Schwenen

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

This article employs a simple model to describe bidding behavior in multi-unit uniform price procurement auctions when firms are capacity constrained. Using data from the New York City procurement auctions for power generating capacity, I find that firms use simple bidding strategies to coordinate on an equilibrium that extracts high rents for all bidders. I show theoretically and empirically that the largest bidder submits the auction clearing bid. All other bidders submit inframarginal bids that are low enough to not be profitably undercut. Inframarginal bidders decrease their bids as the pivotal firm's capacities and its profits of undercutting increase.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftRAND Journal of Economics
Vol/bind46
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)730-750
Antal sider21
ISSN0741-6261
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2015

Citer dette

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Strategic Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions with Capacity Constrained Bidders : The New York Capacity Market. / Schwenen, Sebastian.

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Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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