Strategic Behavior and Social Outcomes in a Bottleneck Queue

Experimental Evidence

Jesper Breinbjerg, Alexander Sebald, Lars Peter Østerdal

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

We theoretically and experimentally study the differential incentive effects of three well known queue disciplines in a strategic environment in which a bottleneck facility opens and impatient players decide when to arrive. For a class of three-player games, we derive equilibrium arrivals under the first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO), and service-in-random-order (SIRO) queue disciplines and compare these predictions to outcomes from a laboratory experiment. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that people arrive with greater dispersion when participating under the LIFO discipline, whereas they tend to arrive immediately under FIFO and SIRO. As a consequence, shorter waiting times are obtained under LIFO as compared to FIFO and SIRO. However, while our theoretical predictions admit higher welfare under LIFO, this is not recovered experimentally as the queue disciplines provide similar welfare outcomes.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftReview of Economic Design
Vol/bind20
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)207–236
ISSN1434-4742
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2016
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Queue disciplines
  • Congestion
  • Equilibrium
  • Experiments
  • Fairness

Citer dette

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Strategic Behavior and Social Outcomes in a Bottleneck Queue : Experimental Evidence. / Breinbjerg, Jesper; Sebald, Alexander; Østerdal, Lars Peter.

I: Review of Economic Design, Bind 20, Nr. 3, 2016, s. 207–236.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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