Social Preferences and Labor Market Policy

Trine Filges, John Kennes, Birthe Larsen, Torben Tranæs

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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Resumé

We find that the main featues of labor policy across OECD countries can be explained by a simple general equilibrium search model with risk neutral agents and a government that chooses policy to maximize a social welfare function. In equilibrum, policies are chosen to optimal redistribute income from advantaged to disadvantaged workers. A worker can be disadvantaged in the sense that they may have less ability to aquire and utilize skills in the workplace. The model explains why passive benefits tend to fall and active benefits tend to increase during the course of unemployment spell. The model also explains why countries that appear to pursue equity spend more on both active and passive labor market programs.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelses stedFrederiksberg
UdgiverCopenhagen Business School, CBS
Antal sider29
StatusUdgivet - 2006
NavnWorking Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Nummer13-2006

Citer dette

Filges, T., Kennes, J., Larsen, B., & Tranæs, T. (2006). Social Preferences and Labor Market Policy. Frederiksberg: Copenhagen Business School, CBS. Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School, Nr. 13-2006
Filges, Trine ; Kennes, John ; Larsen, Birthe ; Tranæs, Torben. / Social Preferences and Labor Market Policy. Frederiksberg : Copenhagen Business School, CBS, 2006. (Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School; Nr. 13-2006).
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Filges, T, Kennes, J, Larsen, B & Tranæs, T 2006 'Social Preferences and Labor Market Policy' Copenhagen Business School, CBS, Frederiksberg.

Social Preferences and Labor Market Policy. / Filges, Trine; Kennes, John; Larsen, Birthe; Tranæs, Torben.

Frederiksberg : Copenhagen Business School, CBS, 2006.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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Filges T, Kennes J, Larsen B, Tranæs T. Social Preferences and Labor Market Policy. Frederiksberg: Copenhagen Business School, CBS. 2006.