Smoke Signal or Smoke Screen? Why the Media Do Not Disapprove Equally or Overpaid CEOs

Jean-Philippe Vergne, Georg Wernicke, Steffen Brenner

    Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

    Abstrakt

    This paper explains the amount of disapproval faced by firms that overpay their CEO by integrating signaling and categorization theories. We argue that, in contexts characterized by intense scrutiny, ambivalent signals sent by firms suspend categorization by stakeholders, leading to further disapproval, whereas ambiguous signals represent a form of category straddling that attenuates disapproval. We find empirical support for this proposition in the context of CEO overcompensation in the U.S. (1995-2007) after examining two organizational signals that affect perceptions of economic fairness (i.e. corporate philanthropy) and social fairness (i.e. employee diversity). Our integration of the signaling and categorization literatures adds to extant knowledge on firm’s social evaluations and recasts CEO compensation research within the literature on information intermediaries.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    Publikationsdato2015
    Antal sider42
    StatusUdgivet - 2015
    BegivenhedThe 15th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2015: Uncertainty is a Great Opportunity - Warsaw, Polen
    Varighed: 17 jun. 201520 jun. 2015
    Konferencens nummer: 15
    http://euramonline.org/euram-15.html

    Konference

    KonferenceThe 15th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2015
    Nummer15
    LandPolen
    ByWarsaw
    Periode17/06/201520/06/2015
    Internetadresse

    Bibliografisk note

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    Emneord

    • Signaling
    • Media disapproval
    • CEO pay

    Citationsformater

    Vergne, J-P., Wernicke, G., & Brenner, S. (2015). Smoke Signal or Smoke Screen? Why the Media Do Not Disapprove Equally or Overpaid CEOs. Afhandling præsenteret på The 15th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2015, Warsaw, Polen.