Robustness of a Distributed Knowledge Management Model

In globalizing competitive markets knowledge exchangebetween business organizations requires incentivemechanisms to ensure tactical purposes while strategicpurposes are subject to joint organization and otherforms of contractual obligations. Where property ofknowledge (e.g. patents and copyrights) and contractbasedknowledge exchange do not obtain networkeffectiveness because of prohibitive transaction costs inreducing uncertainty, we suggest a robust model for peerproduced knowledge within a distributed setting. Thepeer produced knowledge exchange model relies upon adouble loop knowledge conversion with symmetricincentives in a network since the production of actorspecific knowledge makes any knowledge appropriationby use of property rights by the actors irrelevant. Withoutproperty rights in knowledge the actor network generatesopportunity for incentive symmetry over a period of time.The model merges specific knowledge with knowledgefrom other actors into a decision support system specificfor each actor in the network in recognition of actor roledifferences. The article suggests a set of 9 static and 5dynamic propositions for the model to maintainsymmetric incentives between different actor networks.The model is proposed for business networks.