Rewarding the Top

Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians

Lene Holm Pedersen, Jens Olav Dahlgaard, Rasmus Tue Pedersen

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftScandinavian Political Studies
Vol/bind42
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)118-137
Antal sider20
ISSN0080-6757
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2019

Citer dette

Pedersen, Lene Holm ; Dahlgaard, Jens Olav ; Pedersen, Rasmus Tue. / Rewarding the Top : Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians. I: Scandinavian Political Studies. 2019 ; Bind 42, Nr. 2. s. 118-137.
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Rewarding the Top : Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians. / Pedersen, Lene Holm; Dahlgaard, Jens Olav; Pedersen, Rasmus Tue.

I: Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind 42, Nr. 2, 2019, s. 118-137.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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