Revenue Sharing in European Football Leagues: A Theoretical Analysis

Bodil Olai Hansen; Mich Tvede

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_12

Revenue Sharing in European Football Leagues: A Theoretical Analysis

Bodil Olai Hansen, Mich Tvede

Økonomisk Institut

Newcastle University

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning › peer review

Abstract

In the present chapter, a general model of competition between clubs in sports leagues with flexible supply of inputs is studied. There are externalities between clubs because it takes more than one club to produce games and tournaments. It is assumed that the externalities take the form of complementarities. Firstly, it is shown that revenue sharing leads to lower overall quality of sports leagues. Secondly, it is shown that the optimal quality for the league is lower (higher) than the quality in a league without revenue sharing in case of negative (positive) externalities between clubs. Thirdly an example is used to illustrate the findings.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Titel	Trends in Mathematical Economics : Dialogues Between Southern Europe and Latin America
Redaktører	Alberto A. Pinto, Elvio Accinelli Gamba, Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos, Carlos Hervés-Beloso
Antal sider	18
Udgivelsessted	Cham
Forlag	Springer Science+Business Media
Publikationsdato	2016
Sider	245-262
Kapitel	12
ISBN (Trykt)	9783319325415
ISBN (Elektronisk)	9783319325439
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_12
Status	Udgivet - 2016

Emneord

Complementarity
Revenue sharing
Sports leagues
Supermodularity
Competition in sports leagues
European vs. American sports leagues
Level of talent
Profit maximization

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10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_12Licens: Ikke-specificeret

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Citationsformater

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abstract = "In the present chapter, a general model of competition between clubs in sports leagues with flexible supply of inputs is studied. There are externalities between clubs because it takes more than one club to produce games and tournaments. It is assumed that the externalities take the form of complementarities. Firstly, it is shown that revenue sharing leads to lower overall quality of sports leagues. Secondly, it is shown that the optimal quality for the league is lower (higher) than the quality in a league without revenue sharing in case of negative (positive) externalities between clubs. Thirdly an example is used to illustrate the findings.",

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Revenue Sharing in European Football Leagues: A Theoretical Analysis. / Olai Hansen, Bodil; Tvede, Mich.
Trends in Mathematical Economics: Dialogues Between Southern Europe and Latin America. red. / Alberto A. Pinto; Elvio Accinelli Gamba; Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos; Carlos Hervés-Beloso. Cham: Springer Science+Business Media, 2016. s. 245-262.

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning › peer review

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