Revenue Deficiency Under Second-price Auctions in a Supply-chain Setting

Dolores Romero Morales, Richard Steinberg

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Consider a firm, called the buyer, that satisfies its demand over two periods by assigning both demands to a supplier via a second-price procurement auction; call this the Standard auction. In the hope of lowering its purchase cost, the firm is considering an alternative procedure in which it will also allow bids on each period individually, where there can be either one or two winners covering the two demands; call this the Multiple Winner auction. Choosing the Multiple Winner auction over the Standard auction can in fact result in a higher cost to the buyer. We provide a bound on how much greater the buyer’s cost can be in the Multiple Winner auction and show that this bound is tight. We then sharpen this bound for two scenarios that can arise when the buyer announces his demands close to the beginning of the demand horizon. Under a monotonicity condition, we achieve a further sharpening of the bound in one of the scenarios. Finally, this monotonicity condition allows us to generalize this bound to the T-period case in which bids are allowed on any subset of period demands.
Consider a firm, called the buyer, that satisfies its demand over two periods by assigning both demands to a supplier via a second-price procurement auction; call this the Standard auction. In the hope of lowering its purchase cost, the firm is considering an alternative procedure in which it will also allow bids on each period individually, where there can be either one or two winners covering the two demands; call this the Multiple Winner auction. Choosing the Multiple Winner auction over the Standard auction can in fact result in a higher cost to the buyer. We provide a bound on how much greater the buyer’s cost can be in the Multiple Winner auction and show that this bound is tight. We then sharpen this bound for two scenarios that can arise when the buyer announces his demands close to the beginning of the demand horizon. Under a monotonicity condition, we achieve a further sharpening of the bound in one of the scenarios. Finally, this monotonicity condition allows us to generalize this bound to the T-period case in which bids are allowed on any subset of period demands.
SprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Vol/bind233
Udgave nummer1
Sider131–144
ISSN0377-2217
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2014
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Procurement
  • Supply chain
  • Second-price auction
  • VCG mechanism
  • Revenue deficiency

Citer dette

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Revenue Deficiency Under Second-price Auctions in a Supply-chain Setting. / Morales, Dolores Romero; Steinberg, Richard.

I: European Journal of Operational Research, Bind 233, Nr. 1, 2014, s. 131–144.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

TY - JOUR

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AU - Steinberg,Richard

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N2 - Consider a firm, called the buyer, that satisfies its demand over two periods by assigning both demands to a supplier via a second-price procurement auction; call this the Standard auction. In the hope of lowering its purchase cost, the firm is considering an alternative procedure in which it will also allow bids on each period individually, where there can be either one or two winners covering the two demands; call this the Multiple Winner auction. Choosing the Multiple Winner auction over the Standard auction can in fact result in a higher cost to the buyer. We provide a bound on how much greater the buyer’s cost can be in the Multiple Winner auction and show that this bound is tight. We then sharpen this bound for two scenarios that can arise when the buyer announces his demands close to the beginning of the demand horizon. Under a monotonicity condition, we achieve a further sharpening of the bound in one of the scenarios. Finally, this monotonicity condition allows us to generalize this bound to the T-period case in which bids are allowed on any subset of period demands.

AB - Consider a firm, called the buyer, that satisfies its demand over two periods by assigning both demands to a supplier via a second-price procurement auction; call this the Standard auction. In the hope of lowering its purchase cost, the firm is considering an alternative procedure in which it will also allow bids on each period individually, where there can be either one or two winners covering the two demands; call this the Multiple Winner auction. Choosing the Multiple Winner auction over the Standard auction can in fact result in a higher cost to the buyer. We provide a bound on how much greater the buyer’s cost can be in the Multiple Winner auction and show that this bound is tight. We then sharpen this bound for two scenarios that can arise when the buyer announces his demands close to the beginning of the demand horizon. Under a monotonicity condition, we achieve a further sharpening of the bound in one of the scenarios. Finally, this monotonicity condition allows us to generalize this bound to the T-period case in which bids are allowed on any subset of period demands.

KW - Procurement

KW - Supply chain

KW - Second-price auction

KW - VCG mechanism

KW - Revenue deficiency

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