Reconciling Contracts and Relational Governance through Strategic Contracting

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Purpose: In an industrial marketing context of manufacturer–distributor collaboration, this law and economics paper aims to contrast two approaches to contracting: conventional and strategic.
Design/methodology/approach: Based on relational rent theory, this paper provides an analytical framework for juxtaposing conventional and strategic contracting. A contingency approach is applied to formulate propositions as to when conventional versus strategic contracting is preferable.
Findings: The distinction between conventional and strategic contracting has implications as to whether relational governance substitutes or complements formal contracts (the substitution versus complements perspectives). Strategic contracting results in complementarity (rather than substitutability) between formal contracts and relational governance.
Research limitations/implications: This paper argues that a more nuanced view on contract types, such as strategic versus conventional, may reconcile the enduring research controversy between the substitution and complements perspectives.
Practical implications: Today, formal contracts with foreign distributors tend to resemble “prenuptial agreements”. The opportunity for relational rent (e.g. manifested in higher export revenues) grows if conventional contracts are superseded by contracts following strategic contracting principles.
Originality/value: This study is interdisciplinary, not only by its combination of marketing, management and contractual economics but also through its law and economics amalgamation.
Purpose: In an industrial marketing context of manufacturer–distributor collaboration, this law and economics paper aims to contrast two approaches to contracting: conventional and strategic.
Design/methodology/approach: Based on relational rent theory, this paper provides an analytical framework for juxtaposing conventional and strategic contracting. A contingency approach is applied to formulate propositions as to when conventional versus strategic contracting is preferable.
Findings: The distinction between conventional and strategic contracting has implications as to whether relational governance substitutes or complements formal contracts (the substitution versus complements perspectives). Strategic contracting results in complementarity (rather than substitutability) between formal contracts and relational governance.
Research limitations/implications: This paper argues that a more nuanced view on contract types, such as strategic versus conventional, may reconcile the enduring research controversy between the substitution and complements perspectives.
Practical implications: Today, formal contracts with foreign distributors tend to resemble “prenuptial agreements”. The opportunity for relational rent (e.g. manifested in higher export revenues) grows if conventional contracts are superseded by contracts following strategic contracting principles.
Originality/value: This study is interdisciplinary, not only by its combination of marketing, management and contractual economics but also through its law and economics amalgamation.
SprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Business and Industrial Marketing
Vol/bind33
Udgave nummer3
Sider265-276
Antal sider12
ISSN0885-8624
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2018

Emneord

  • Strategic management
  • Governance
  • Partnering
  • Intermediaries
  • Business-to-business marketing
  • Contracts

Citer dette

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title = "Reconciling Contracts and Relational Governance through Strategic Contracting",
abstract = "Purpose: In an industrial marketing context of manufacturer–distributor collaboration, this law and economics paper aims to contrast two approaches to contracting: conventional and strategic.Design/methodology/approach: Based on relational rent theory, this paper provides an analytical framework for juxtaposing conventional and strategic contracting. A contingency approach is applied to formulate propositions as to when conventional versus strategic contracting is preferable.Findings: The distinction between conventional and strategic contracting has implications as to whether relational governance substitutes or complements formal contracts (the substitution versus complements perspectives). Strategic contracting results in complementarity (rather than substitutability) between formal contracts and relational governance.Research limitations/implications: This paper argues that a more nuanced view on contract types, such as strategic versus conventional, may reconcile the enduring research controversy between the substitution and complements perspectives.Practical implications: Today, formal contracts with foreign distributors tend to resemble “prenuptial agreements”. The opportunity for relational rent (e.g. manifested in higher export revenues) grows if conventional contracts are superseded by contracts following strategic contracting principles.Originality/value: This study is interdisciplinary, not only by its combination of marketing, management and contractual economics but also through its law and economics amalgamation.",
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Reconciling Contracts and Relational Governance through Strategic Contracting. / Petersen, Bent; Østergaard, Kim.

I: Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Bind 33, Nr. 3, 2018, s. 265-276.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

TY - JOUR

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N2 - Purpose: In an industrial marketing context of manufacturer–distributor collaboration, this law and economics paper aims to contrast two approaches to contracting: conventional and strategic.Design/methodology/approach: Based on relational rent theory, this paper provides an analytical framework for juxtaposing conventional and strategic contracting. A contingency approach is applied to formulate propositions as to when conventional versus strategic contracting is preferable.Findings: The distinction between conventional and strategic contracting has implications as to whether relational governance substitutes or complements formal contracts (the substitution versus complements perspectives). Strategic contracting results in complementarity (rather than substitutability) between formal contracts and relational governance.Research limitations/implications: This paper argues that a more nuanced view on contract types, such as strategic versus conventional, may reconcile the enduring research controversy between the substitution and complements perspectives.Practical implications: Today, formal contracts with foreign distributors tend to resemble “prenuptial agreements”. The opportunity for relational rent (e.g. manifested in higher export revenues) grows if conventional contracts are superseded by contracts following strategic contracting principles.Originality/value: This study is interdisciplinary, not only by its combination of marketing, management and contractual economics but also through its law and economics amalgamation.

AB - Purpose: In an industrial marketing context of manufacturer–distributor collaboration, this law and economics paper aims to contrast two approaches to contracting: conventional and strategic.Design/methodology/approach: Based on relational rent theory, this paper provides an analytical framework for juxtaposing conventional and strategic contracting. A contingency approach is applied to formulate propositions as to when conventional versus strategic contracting is preferable.Findings: The distinction between conventional and strategic contracting has implications as to whether relational governance substitutes or complements formal contracts (the substitution versus complements perspectives). Strategic contracting results in complementarity (rather than substitutability) between formal contracts and relational governance.Research limitations/implications: This paper argues that a more nuanced view on contract types, such as strategic versus conventional, may reconcile the enduring research controversy between the substitution and complements perspectives.Practical implications: Today, formal contracts with foreign distributors tend to resemble “prenuptial agreements”. The opportunity for relational rent (e.g. manifested in higher export revenues) grows if conventional contracts are superseded by contracts following strategic contracting principles.Originality/value: This study is interdisciplinary, not only by its combination of marketing, management and contractual economics but also through its law and economics amalgamation.

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KW - Intermediaries

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