Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations and Welfare

Pascalis Raimondos, Alan D. Woodland

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

We propose a reciprocity rule for use in multilateral trade policy negotiations that is guaranteed to raise welfare of all participating countries under minimal assumptions. Our reciprocity rule requires all countries to raise the quantities of their net imports by the same proportion. We show that, starting from a Nash tariff equilibrium, a tariff reform that delivers proportional increases in all countries' net imports will unambiguously raise welfare in each country. The structure imposed by the quantity-based reciprocity rule delivers this strong welfare result for a household welfare maximizing government without concern for general equilibrium price impacts. However, it does not generalize to the wide range of political economy welfare functions handled by Bagwell and Staiger.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of International Economics
Vol/bind111
Sider (fra-til)134-142
Antal sider9
ISSN0022-1996
DOI
StatusUdgivet - maj 2018
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Trade negotiations
  • Reciprocity
  • Tariff reform

Citer dette

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Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations and Welfare. / Raimondos, Pascalis; Woodland, Alan D.

I: Journal of International Economics, Bind 111, 05.2018, s. 134-142.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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