Abstract
We examine welfare effects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with final consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Publikationsdato | 2018 |
| Antal sider | 39 |
| Status | Udgivet - 2018 |
| Begivenhed | VII International Academic Symposium: Smart Energy Systems from a New Energy Policy Approach - Parc Científic de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spanien Varighed: 5 feb. 2019 → 5 feb. 2019 Konferencens nummer: 7 https://ieb.ub.edu/en/event/vii-international-academic-symposium/ |
Konference
| Konference | VII International Academic Symposium |
|---|---|
| Nummer | 7 |
| Lokation | Parc Científic de Barcelona |
| Land/Område | Spanien |
| By | Barcelona |
| Periode | 05/02/2019 → 05/02/2019 |
| Internetadresse |
Emneord
- Electricity
- Real-time pricing
- Market power
- Efficiency
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