Abstract
We examine welfare eects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with nal consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand
case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.
case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Publikationsdato | 2011 |
| Antal sider | 38 |
| Status | Udgivet - 2011 |
| Begivenhed | The 10th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2012 - George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Virginia, USA Varighed: 16 mar. 2012 → 18 mar. 2012 Konferencens nummer: 10 http://editorialexpress.com/conference/IIOC2012/program/IIOC2012.html |
Konference
| Konference | The 10th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2012 |
|---|---|
| Nummer | 10 |
| Lokation | George Mason University School of Law |
| Land/Område | USA |
| By | Arlington, Virginia |
| Periode | 16/03/2012 → 18/03/2012 |
| Internetadresse |
Emneord
- Electricity
- Real-time Pricing
- Market Power
- Efficiency