Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?

Anette Boom, Sebastian Schwenen

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

We examine welfare eects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with nal consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand
case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdato2011
Antal sider38
StatusUdgivet - 2011
BegivenhedJahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012 - Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Göttingen, Tyskland
Varighed: 9 sep. 201212 sep. 2012
http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/325378.html

Konference

KonferenceJahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012
LokationGeorg-August-Universität Göttingen
LandTyskland
ByGöttingen
Periode09/09/201212/09/2012
Internetadresse

Emneord

  • Electricity
  • Real-time Pricing
  • Market Power
  • Efficiency

Citationsformater

Boom, A., & Schwenen, S. (2011). Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?. Paper præsenteret på Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012, Göttingen, Tyskland. http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8610