Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

Resumé

Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdato2015
Antal sider32
StatusUdgivet - 2015
BegivenhedJahrestagung des Vereins fuer Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Münster, Tyskland
Varighed: 6 sep. 20159 sep. 2015
https://www.socialpolitik.de/De/jahrestagung-2015

Konference

KonferenceJahrestagung des Vereins fuer Socialpolitik 2015
LandTyskland
ByMünster
Periode06/09/201509/09/2015
Internetadresse

Bibliografisk note

CBS Bibliotek har ikke adgang til materialet

Emneord

  • Electricity
  • Capacity markets
  • Price regulation

Citer dette

Boom, A. (2015). Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. Afhandling præsenteret på Jahrestagung des Vereins fuer Socialpolitik 2015, Münster, Tyskland.
Boom, Anette. / Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. Afhandling præsenteret på Jahrestagung des Vereins fuer Socialpolitik 2015, Münster, Tyskland.32 s.
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Boom, A 2015, 'Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction' Paper fremlagt ved Jahrestagung des Vereins fuer Socialpolitik 2015, Münster, Tyskland, 06/09/2015 - 09/09/2015, .

Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. / Boom, Anette.

2015. Afhandling præsenteret på Jahrestagung des Vereins fuer Socialpolitik 2015, Münster, Tyskland.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

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N2 - Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.

AB - Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.

KW - Electricity

KW - Capacity markets

KW - Price regulation

KW - Electricity

KW - Capacity markets

KW - Price regulation

M3 - Paper

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Boom A. Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. 2015. Afhandling præsenteret på Jahrestagung des Vereins fuer Socialpolitik 2015, Münster, Tyskland.