Abstract
Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Publikationsdato | 2014 |
| Antal sider | 27 |
| Status | Udgivet - 2014 |
| Begivenhed | The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014 - Northwestern Law Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth, Chicago, IL, USA Varighed: 11 apr. 2014 → 13 apr. 2014 Konferencens nummer: 12 http://editorialexpress.com/conference/IIOC2014/program/IIOC2014.html |
Konference
| Konference | The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014 |
|---|---|
| Nummer | 12 |
| Lokation | Northwestern Law Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth |
| Land/Område | USA |
| By | Chicago, IL |
| Periode | 11/04/2014 → 13/04/2014 |
| Internetadresse |
Emneord
- Electricity
- Capacity markets
- Price regulation