Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

Resumé

Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdato2014
Antal sider27
StatusUdgivet - 2014
BegivenhedThe 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014 - Northwestern Law Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth, Chicago, IL, USA
Varighed: 11 apr. 201413 apr. 2014
Konferencens nummer: 12
http://editorialexpress.com/conference/IIOC2014/program/IIOC2014.html

Konference

KonferenceThe 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014
Nummer12
LokationNorthwestern Law Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth
LandUSA
ByChicago, IL
Periode11/04/201413/04/2014
Internetadresse

Bibliografisk note

CBS Bibliotek har ikke adgang til materialet

Emneord

  • Electricity
  • Capacity markets
  • Price regulation

Citer dette

Boom, A. (2014). Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. Afhandling præsenteret på The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014, Chicago, IL, USA.
Boom, Anette. / Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. Afhandling præsenteret på The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014, Chicago, IL, USA.27 s.
@conference{d5ed5425a8f24947acd4ffce2e47aa46,
title = "Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction",
abstract = "Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.",
keywords = "Electricity, Capacity markets, Price regulation",
author = "Anette Boom",
note = "CBS Library does not have access to the material; null ; Conference date: 11-04-2014 Through 13-04-2014",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
url = "http://editorialexpress.com/conference/IIOC2014/program/IIOC2014.html",

}

Boom, A 2014, 'Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction' Paper fremlagt ved The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014, Chicago, IL, USA, 11/04/2014 - 13/04/2014, .

Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. / Boom, Anette.

2014. Afhandling præsenteret på The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014, Chicago, IL, USA.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

TY - CONF

T1 - Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

AU - Boom, Anette

N1 - CBS Library does not have access to the material

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.

AB - Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.

KW - Electricity

KW - Capacity markets

KW - Price regulation

M3 - Paper

ER -

Boom A. Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. 2014. Afhandling præsenteret på The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014, Chicago, IL, USA.