Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

Resumé

Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdato2014
Antal sider27
StatusUdgivet - 2014
BegivenhedThe 9th Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization. NORIO 2014 - University of Oslo, Oslo, Norge
Varighed: 2 jun. 20143 jun. 2014
Konferencens nummer: 9
http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/news-and-events/events/conferences/2014/dokumenter/programme.html

Workshop

WorkshopThe 9th Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization. NORIO 2014
Nummer9
LokationUniversity of Oslo
LandNorge
ByOslo
Periode02/06/201403/06/2014
Internetadresse

Emneord

  • Electricity
  • Capacity markets
  • Price regulation

Citer dette

Boom, A. (2014). Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. Afhandling præsenteret på The 9th Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization. NORIO 2014, Oslo, Norge.
Boom, Anette. / Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. Afhandling præsenteret på The 9th Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization. NORIO 2014, Oslo, Norge.27 s.
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abstract = "Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.",
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Boom, A 2014, 'Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction' Paper fremlagt ved The 9th Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization. NORIO 2014, Oslo, Norge, 02/06/2014 - 03/06/2014, .

Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. / Boom, Anette.

2014. Afhandling præsenteret på The 9th Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization. NORIO 2014, Oslo, Norge.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

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AU - Boom, Anette

PY - 2014

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N2 - Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.

AB - Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.

KW - Electricity

KW - Capacity markets

KW - Price regulation

M3 - Paper

ER -

Boom A. Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. 2014. Afhandling præsenteret på The 9th Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization. NORIO 2014, Oslo, Norge.