Player Remuneration in Professional Team Sports Leagues: Is there a Trade-off between Pay and Contract Length? Empirical Evidence from the NBA

Bernd Frick, Joachim Prinz

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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Abstrakt

Until recently, the transfer of professional teamplayers between European clubs placed limits on the operations of a free market in that there were rules restricting the terms placed on such transfers. However, the ruling of the European Court of Justice in December 1995 in the "Bosman case" declared that such arrangements were contrary to the provisions of article 48 of the EEC treaty. The effects of the ruling –a redistribution of property rights from the clubs to the players- induced an increase of average player salaries and longer contract duration. Using data from the National Basketball Association (NBA) the paper discusses a highly similar reallocation of property rights in North America and tests empirically the -so far- inconclusive question, if remuneration and contract-length are complementary or substitutes.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
UdgivelsesstedFrederiksberg
UdgiverThe Link Program
Antal sider22
StatusUdgivet - 2000
Udgivet eksterntJa
NavnLINK Working Paper
Nummer2000-19

Citationsformater