Abstract
A monopoly integrator platform contracts with two developers and sells to acontinuum of consumers. We study two contractual implementation modes betweenthe platform and the developers under adverse selection, also permitting for a de-velopment stage. Exemplifying a new “openness-versus-control” trade-off, Bayesianimplementation leads to more distortions in equilibrium. The alternative, more opencontracting mode of Pareto-dominant strategy implementation, not yet studied in aplatform context, enables more first-best outcomes under joint quality determinationand higher expected consumer surplus. Our analysis delivers a new explanation forplatform-based organizational choices.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Publikationsdato | 2019 |
| Antal sider | 33 |
| Status | Udgivet - 2019 |
| Begivenhed | 46th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics. EARIE 2019 - Ciutadella of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spanien Varighed: 30 aug. 2019 → 1 sep. 2019 Konferencens nummer: 46 https://www.barcelonagse.eu/earie2019 |
Konference
| Konference | 46th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics. EARIE 2019 |
|---|---|
| Nummer | 46 |
| Lokation | Ciutadella of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Land/Område | Spanien |
| By | Barcelona |
| Periode | 30/08/2019 → 01/09/2019 |
| Internetadresse |
Emneord
- Platform organization
- Openness vs. control
- Quality and component development
- Pareto-dominant strategy implementation vs. Bayesian implementation