Performance Pay, Delegation and Multitasking under Uncertainty and Innovativeness: An Empirical Investigation

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

    Abstrakt

    It has been recently noted that the trade-off between risk and incentives that agency theory predicts turns out to be rather weak. We examine predictions from agency theory on the basis of data from a data set encompassing close to 1000 Danish firms. We find that the relation between performance pay and environmental uncertainty is indeed weak. We examine the relation between delegation and environmental uncertainty, and find that this relation is confirmed. We also examine the multi-tasking agency hypothesis that as risk increases, the flexibility of agents is restricted. We fail to find support for this hypothesis.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
    Vol/bind58
    Udgave nummer2
    Sider (fra-til)246-276
    ISSN0167-2681
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 2005

    Emneord

    • Uncertainty
    • Pay-for-performance
    • Delegation
    • Innovation
    • Competition

    Citationsformater