Partnering Contracts and the inefficient Nash Equilibrium

Christina D. Tvarnø, Henriette Schleimann

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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Abstrakt

This paper discusses partnering contracts in Denmark and Great Britain, analyses the legal content and applies game theory and the Prisoners’ Dilemma game on some of the legal clauses and objectives. The paper defines partnering contracts as alternative social contracts relevant when forming a strategic alliance or another long-term relationship with a certain degree of specificity and frequency. The paper focuses on partnering in the construction industry and compares the clauses in both Danish and British partnering contracts. Based on the analysis, the paper sets up a scientific definition regarding the aim of partnering contracts and shows that economic theory can explain the legal clauses in the partnering contract, and the partnering contract can solve inefficiency in the Nash equilibrium in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. The
partnering contract makes it possible to obtain the benefit from joint utility and the paper proposes some legal improvements in this regard.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelses stedFrederiksberg
UdgiverCopenhagen Business School [wp]
Antal sider17
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2019
NavnCopenhagen Business School Law Research Paper Series
Nummer19-13

Citationsformater

Tvarnø, C. D., & Schleimann, H. (2019). Partnering Contracts and the inefficient Nash Equilibrium. Copenhagen Business School [wp]. Copenhagen Business School Law Research Paper Series, Nr. 19-13 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3356622