Out of Time?

National Parliaments and Early Decision Making in the European Union

Mads Dagnis Jensen, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Co-decisions between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are increasingly adopted as early agreements. Recent EU studies have pinpointed how this informal turn in EU governance has altered the existing balance of power between EU actors and within EU institutions. However, the implications of accelerated EU decision-making are expected to have repercussions beyond the EU system and in other institutions impinging on the role of national parliaments. This study examines the implications of an alteration of EU political time on national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize their executives in EU affairs. A mixed method approach has been applied. This strategy combines survey data on national parliaments’ scrutiny process and response to early agreements for 26 EU countries with a case study examination of national parliaments in Denmark, the UK and Germany. The burgeoning research agenda on EU timescapes is applied. This study finds that the clocks of most national parliaments are out of time with the EU decision-mode of early agreements, which severely hampers the national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize national governments.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftGovernment and Opposition
Vol/bind50
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)240-270
Antal sider31
ISSN0017-257X
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2015
Udgivet eksterntJa

Citer dette

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Out of Time? National Parliaments and Early Decision Making in the European Union. / Jensen, Mads Dagnis; Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg.

I: Government and Opposition, Bind 50, Nr. 2, 2015, s. 240-270.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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