Organizational governance

Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein

    Publikation: Working paperForskning

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    Abstrakt

    This chapter reviews and discusses rational-choice approaches to organizational governance. These approaches are found primarily in organizational economics (virtually no rational-choice organizational sociology exists), particularly in transaction cost economics, principal-agent theory, and the incomplete-contracts or property-rights approach. We distill the main unifying characteristics of these streams, survey each stream, and offer some critical commentary and suggestions for moving forward.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    UdgivelsesstedFrederksberg
    UdgiverCenter for Strategic Management and Globalization
    Antal sider74
    ISBN (Trykt)9788791815126
    StatusUdgivet - okt. 2007
    NavnSMG Working Paper
    Nummer11/2007

    Emneord

    • virksomhed&politik

    Citationsformater