One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence

Thomas Poulsen, Johan E. Eklund

    Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

    Abstrakt

    Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    Publikationsdato2010
    Antal sider28
    StatusUdgivet - 2010
    BegivenhedThe 10th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2010 - Rome, Italien
    Varighed: 19 maj 201022 maj 2010
    Konferencens nummer: 10
    http://www.euram2010.org/r/default.asp?iId=EGGMKK

    Konference

    KonferenceThe 10th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2010
    Nummer10
    LandItalien
    ByRome
    Periode19/05/201022/05/2010
    AndetBack to the Future
    Internetadresse

    Emneord

    • Ownership structure
    • One share-one vote
    • Proportionality
    • Performance
    • Entrenchment

    Citationsformater

    Poulsen, T., & Eklund, J. E. (2010). One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence. Afhandling præsenteret på The 10th European Academy of Management Conference (EURAM) 2010, Rome, Italien.