On Two Competing Affirmative Actions under Deferred Acceptance Algorithm

Yun Liu

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

Resumé

In this paper, we study two kinds of affirmative action policies, quota-based and reserve-based, under the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM). We first try to reveal the source of perverse affirmative action policies, especially on the purported beneficiaries. We show that a variant of Ergin-acyclicity structure, type-specific acyclicity, is crucial for effective affirmative action policies. This result may provide a simple criterion to decide whether affirmative action is appropriate to implement under certain market structure. We next include college's incentive into consideration, and indicate that for all markets without type-specific cycles and with sufficient competition for each unfilled seat, the reserve-based affirmative action is more vulnerable to manipulation compare to its quota-based counterpart. This argument implies that the efficiency gain from the more flexible reserve-based policy may be offset by its vulnerability to manipulation. Under some regularity conditions, we demonstrate that truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium when the number of colleges is sufficiently large.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdato2014
Antal sider28
StatusUdgivet - 2014
BegivenhedEuropean Economic Association & Econometric Society 2014 Parallel Meetings - Toulouse, Frankrig
Varighed: 25 aug. 201429 aug. 2014
http://www.eea-esem.com/EEA-ESEM/2014

Konference

KonferenceEuropean Economic Association & Econometric Society 2014 Parallel Meetings
LandFrankrig
ByToulouse
Periode25/08/201429/08/2014
Internetadresse

Emneord

  • Affirmative action
  • Acyclicity
  • Two-sided matching
  • Large markets

Citer dette

Liu, Y. (2014). On Two Competing Affirmative Actions under Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. Afhandling præsenteret på European Economic Association & Econometric Society 2014 Parallel Meetings, Toulouse, Frankrig.
Liu, Yun. / On Two Competing Affirmative Actions under Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. Afhandling præsenteret på European Economic Association & Econometric Society 2014 Parallel Meetings, Toulouse, Frankrig.28 s.
@conference{008c7d4e6e2f41f7819947775412c153,
title = "On Two Competing Affirmative Actions under Deferred Acceptance Algorithm",
abstract = "In this paper, we study two kinds of affirmative action policies, quota-based and reserve-based, under the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM). We first try to reveal the source of perverse affirmative action policies, especially on the purported beneficiaries. We show that a variant of Ergin-acyclicity structure, type-specific acyclicity, is crucial for effective affirmative action policies. This result may provide a simple criterion to decide whether affirmative action is appropriate to implement under certain market structure. We next include college's incentive into consideration, and indicate that for all markets without type-specific cycles and with sufficient competition for each unfilled seat, the reserve-based affirmative action is more vulnerable to manipulation compare to its quota-based counterpart. This argument implies that the efficiency gain from the more flexible reserve-based policy may be offset by its vulnerability to manipulation. Under some regularity conditions, we demonstrate that truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium when the number of colleges is sufficiently large.",
keywords = "Affirmative action, Acyclicity, Two-sided matching, Large markets",
author = "Yun Liu",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
note = "null ; Conference date: 25-08-2014 Through 29-08-2014",
url = "http://www.eea-esem.com/EEA-ESEM/2014",

}

Liu, Y 2014, 'On Two Competing Affirmative Actions under Deferred Acceptance Algorithm' Paper fremlagt ved European Economic Association & Econometric Society 2014 Parallel Meetings, Toulouse, Frankrig, 25/08/2014 - 29/08/2014, .

On Two Competing Affirmative Actions under Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. / Liu, Yun.

2014. Afhandling præsenteret på European Economic Association & Econometric Society 2014 Parallel Meetings, Toulouse, Frankrig.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

TY - CONF

T1 - On Two Competing Affirmative Actions under Deferred Acceptance Algorithm

AU - Liu, Yun

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - In this paper, we study two kinds of affirmative action policies, quota-based and reserve-based, under the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM). We first try to reveal the source of perverse affirmative action policies, especially on the purported beneficiaries. We show that a variant of Ergin-acyclicity structure, type-specific acyclicity, is crucial for effective affirmative action policies. This result may provide a simple criterion to decide whether affirmative action is appropriate to implement under certain market structure. We next include college's incentive into consideration, and indicate that for all markets without type-specific cycles and with sufficient competition for each unfilled seat, the reserve-based affirmative action is more vulnerable to manipulation compare to its quota-based counterpart. This argument implies that the efficiency gain from the more flexible reserve-based policy may be offset by its vulnerability to manipulation. Under some regularity conditions, we demonstrate that truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium when the number of colleges is sufficiently large.

AB - In this paper, we study two kinds of affirmative action policies, quota-based and reserve-based, under the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM). We first try to reveal the source of perverse affirmative action policies, especially on the purported beneficiaries. We show that a variant of Ergin-acyclicity structure, type-specific acyclicity, is crucial for effective affirmative action policies. This result may provide a simple criterion to decide whether affirmative action is appropriate to implement under certain market structure. We next include college's incentive into consideration, and indicate that for all markets without type-specific cycles and with sufficient competition for each unfilled seat, the reserve-based affirmative action is more vulnerable to manipulation compare to its quota-based counterpart. This argument implies that the efficiency gain from the more flexible reserve-based policy may be offset by its vulnerability to manipulation. Under some regularity conditions, we demonstrate that truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium when the number of colleges is sufficiently large.

KW - Affirmative action

KW - Acyclicity

KW - Two-sided matching

KW - Large markets

M3 - Paper

ER -

Liu Y. On Two Competing Affirmative Actions under Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. 2014. Afhandling præsenteret på European Economic Association & Econometric Society 2014 Parallel Meetings, Toulouse, Frankrig.