On Broome’s Notion of Normativity

Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen*

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

As a part of John Broome’s stated aim to establish a clear distinction between rationality and normativity, Broome suggests a novel definition of normativity as a property term that applies to persons. Since this construal of normativity diverges significantly from most prominent renderings of the concept within contemporary philosophical discussions, it merits critical scrutiny. In response to Broome, I thus examine the technical advantage of Broome’s approach, while also indicating some drawbacks of Broome’s novel conceptualization of ‘normative’ and ‘normativity’.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftAustralasian Philosophical Review
Vol/bind4
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)373-378
Antal sider6
ISSN2474-0500
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2021

Emneord

  • Normativity
  • Rationality
  • Reasons
  • John Broome

Citationsformater