Non-existence of Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions with a Common Budget-Constraint

Gagan Ghosh

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

I analyze an auction environment where two units of an object are sold at two simultaneous, sealed-bid, first-price auctions to bidders who have a one-dimensional type space, where a type represents the value a bidder places on each of the two units. All bidders have an identical budget constraint that binds their ability to spend in the auctions. I show that if the valuation distribution is atom-less then there does not exist any equilibrium in behavioral strategies in this auction game.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Artikelnummer428
TidsskriftInternational Journal of Game Theory
Vol/bind44
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)253-274
Antal sider22
ISSN0020-7276
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2015

Emneord

  • Multi-unit auction
  • Budget
  • Private values
  • Equilibrium non-existence

Citer dette

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Non-existence of Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions with a Common Budget-Constraint. / Ghosh, Gagan.

I: International Journal of Game Theory, Bind 44, Nr. 2, 428, 2015, s. 253-274.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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