Abstract
I analyze an auction environment where two units of an object are sold at two simultaneous, sealed-bid, first-price auctions to bidders who have a one-dimensional type space, where a type represents the value a bidder places on each of the two units. All bidders have an identical budget constraint that binds their ability to spend in the auctions. I show that if the valuation distribution is atom-less then there does not exist any equilibrium in behavioral strategies in this auction game.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Artikelnummer | 428 |
Tidsskrift | International Journal of Game Theory |
Vol/bind | 44 |
Udgave nummer | 2 |
Sider (fra-til) | 253-274 |
Antal sider | 22 |
ISSN | 0020-7276 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2015 |
Emneord
- Multi-unit auction
- Budget
- Private values
- Equilibrium non-existence