National Parliaments’ Use of the Political Dialogue

Institutional Lobbyists, Traditionalists or Communicators?

Mette Buskjær Rasmussen, Maja Kluger Dionigi

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

    Resumé

    In this article, we examine the reasons behind national parliamentary engagement in the political dialogue with the Commission. We do so through a qualitative content analysis of over 200 national parliamentary opinions submitted to the Commission in recent years and interviews with national parliamentary representatives and Commission officials. We demonstrate that national parliaments’ engagement with the Commission is not simply a story about venue shopping in which parliaments seek to compensate for their domestic weaknesses. Their activity is driven by a rich repertoire of institutional actions, where parliaments simultaneously act as institutional lobbyists, traditionalists and communicators. They follow three main strategies, including attempts to control their government, influencing EU legislation directly, and engaging in parliamentary branding. Direct parliamentary lobbying of the Commission does not, however, render parliaments’ traditional role of controlling their government redundant as it improves domestic scrutiny methods.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftJournal of Common Market Studies
    Vol/bind56
    Udgave nummer5
    Sider (fra-til)1108-1126
    Antal sider19
    ISSN0021-9886
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - jul. 2018

    Bibliografisk note

    Published online: 30 April 2018

    Emneord

    • Political dialogue
    • National parliaments
    • Legislative activism
    • Lobbying
    • Strategies

    Citer dette

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    National Parliaments’ Use of the Political Dialogue : Institutional Lobbyists, Traditionalists or Communicators? / Buskjær Rasmussen, Mette; Dionigi, Maja Kluger.

    I: Journal of Common Market Studies, Bind 56, Nr. 5, 07.2018, s. 1108-1126.

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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