Multiple Blockholder Structures and Family Firm Performance

Asma Fattoum-Guedri, Zied Guedri, Frédéric Delmar

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

This study examines how multiple blockholder structures affect family firm performance. Building on arguments from both principal–principal agency and familiness perspectives, we suggest that asymmetrical distribution of voting power among family and nonfamily blockholders hurts firm performance. Further, we suggest that the larger the number of blockholder types, the stronger the negative effect of voting-power asymmetry among family and nonfamily blockholders on firm performance. We provide empirical support for our hypotheses using a longitudinal sample of 413 French family firms over the 1992–2012 period.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEntrepreneurship: Theory and Practice
Vol/bind42
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)231-251
Antal sider21
ISSN1042-2587
DOI
StatusUdgivet - mar. 2018

Emneord

  • Blockholders
  • Familiness
  • Family business
  • Principal-principal agency costs

Citer dette

Fattoum-Guedri, Asma ; Guedri, Zied ; Delmar, Frédéric. / Multiple Blockholder Structures and Family Firm Performance. I: Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice. 2018 ; Bind 42, Nr. 2. s. 231-251.
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Multiple Blockholder Structures and Family Firm Performance. / Fattoum-Guedri, Asma; Guedri, Zied; Delmar, Frédéric.

I: Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, Bind 42, Nr. 2, 03.2018, s. 231-251.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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