Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games

Some (Im)Possibility Results

Peter H. Knudsen, Lars Peter Østerdal

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftInternational Journal of Game Theory
Vol/bind41
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)763–774
ISSN0020-7276
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2012
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Cooperative games
  • Manipulation
  • Merging
  • Splitting
  • Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule

Citer dette

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Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games : Some (Im)Possibility Results. / Knudsen, Peter H.; Østerdal, Lars Peter.

I: International Journal of Game Theory, Bind 41, Nr. 4, 2012, s. 763–774.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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