Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games: Some (Im)Possibility Results

Peter H. Knudsen; Lars Peter Østerdal

doi:10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7

Merging and Splitting in Cooperative Games: Some (Im)Possibility Results

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Abstract

Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	International Journal of Game Theory
Vol/bind	41
Udgave nummer	4
Sider (fra-til)	763–774
ISSN	0020-7276
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7
Status	Udgivet - 2012
Udgivet eksternt	Ja

Emneord

Cooperative games
Manipulation
Merging
Splitting
Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule

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10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7Licens: Ikke-specificeret

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Citationsformater

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abstract = "Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments.",

keywords = "Cooperative games, Manipulation, Merging, Splitting, Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule, Cooperative games, Manipulation, Merging, Splitting, Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule",

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AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter

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AB - Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments.

KW - Cooperative games

KW - Manipulation

KW - Merging

KW - Splitting

KW - Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule

KW - Cooperative games

KW - Manipulation

KW - Merging

KW - Splitting

KW - Fujishige-Dutta-Ray allocation rule

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7

DO - 10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7

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