Abstract
McDowell’s defence of disjunctivism is often portrayed as starting from a controversial epistemological access-internalism, which he fails to support in his writings. This paper critiques such interpretations and presents an alternative reading of McDowell’s argument in favour of disjunctivism. Taking outset in McDowell’s early debate with Michael Dummett, it is shown why disjunctivism is a consequence of McDowell’s realism combined with his acceptance of the Fregean claim that Sense determines reference. It is argued that even within the modest approach to meaning theories which McDowell favour, disjunctivism is a necessary requirement for a defence of realism. This approach means that, rather than starting from controversial epistemological convictions, McDowell’s disjunctivism motivates the adoption of access-internalism, as it enables truth-ensuring experiential support for our thoughts. Hence, while I deny that disjunctivism follows from premises about the nature of knowledge, I agree with McDowell that the landscape of our debate about knowledge may be irrevocably altered once we accept disjunctivism.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Artikelnummer | 31 |
Tidsskrift | Synthese |
Vol/bind | 204 |
Udgave nummer | 1 |
Antal sider | 18 |
ISSN | 0039-7857 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - jul. 2024 |
Emneord
- John McDowell
- Disjunctivism
- Realism
- Sense
- Michael Dummett
- Knowledge