Resumé
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | Energy Economics |
Vol/bind | 43 |
Sider (fra-til) | 256-263 |
ISSN | 0140-9883 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 4 mar. 2014 |
Emneord
- Auctions
- Electricity
- Market design
Citer dette
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Market Design and Supply Security in Imperfect Power Markets. / Schwenen, Sebastian.
I: Energy Economics, Bind 43, 04.03.2014, s. 256-263.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Market Design and Supply Security in Imperfect Power Markets
AU - Schwenen, Sebastian
PY - 2014/3/4
Y1 - 2014/3/4
N2 - Supply security in imperfect power markets is modelled under different market designs. In a uniform price auction for electricity with two firms, strategic behaviour may leave firms offering too few capacities and unable to supply all realized demand. Market design that relies oncapacity markets increases available generation capacities for sufficiently high capacity prices and consequently decreases energy prices. However, equilibrium capacity prices are non-competitive. Capacity markets can increase security of supply, but cannot mitigate market power, which is exercised in the capacity market instead of the energy market.
AB - Supply security in imperfect power markets is modelled under different market designs. In a uniform price auction for electricity with two firms, strategic behaviour may leave firms offering too few capacities and unable to supply all realized demand. Market design that relies oncapacity markets increases available generation capacities for sufficiently high capacity prices and consequently decreases energy prices. However, equilibrium capacity prices are non-competitive. Capacity markets can increase security of supply, but cannot mitigate market power, which is exercised in the capacity market instead of the energy market.
KW - Auctions
KW - Electricity
KW - Market design
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U2 - 10.1016/j.eneco.2014.02.012
DO - 10.1016/j.eneco.2014.02.012
M3 - Journal article
VL - 43
SP - 256
EP - 263
JO - Energy Economics
JF - Energy Economics
SN - 0140-9883
ER -