Licensing-In Fosters Rapid Invention!: The Effect of the Grant-Back Clause and Technological Unfamiliarity

Maria Isabella Leone, Toke Reichstein

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Drawing on contractual economics and innovation management, licensing-in is hypothesized to accelerate licensees' invention process. Studying a matched dataset of licensees and non-licensees, licensees are shown to be faster at inventing, but the effect is negated if the license includes a grant-back clause, shifting incentives from licensee to licensor. Also, the effect is significantly reduced if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology. The effect of the grant-back clause is offset if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology, suggesting that the licensee retains the incentives to invent under these circumstances
Drawing on contractual economics and innovation management, licensing-in is hypothesized to accelerate licensees' invention process. Studying a matched dataset of licensees and non-licensees, licensees are shown to be faster at inventing, but the effect is negated if the license includes a grant-back clause, shifting incentives from licensee to licensor. Also, the effect is significantly reduced if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology. The effect of the grant-back clause is offset if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology, suggesting that the licensee retains the incentives to invent under these circumstances
SprogEngelsk
TidsskriftStrategic Management Journal
Vol/bind33
Udgave nummer8
Sider965–985
Antal sider21
ISSN0143-2095
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2012

Emneord

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    Licensing-In Fosters Rapid Invention! The Effect of the Grant-Back Clause and Technological Unfamiliarity. / Leone, Maria Isabella ; Reichstein, Toke.

    I: Strategic Management Journal, Bind 33, Nr. 8, 2012, s. 965–985.

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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