Licensing-In Fosters Rapid Invention! The Effect of the Grant-Back Clause and Technological Unfamiliarity

Maria Isabella Leone, Toke Reichstein

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

    Abstrakt

    Drawing on contractual economics and innovation management, licensing-in is hypothesized to accelerate licensees' invention process. Studying a matched dataset of licensees and non-licensees, licensees are shown to be faster at inventing, but the effect is negated if the license includes a grant-back clause, shifting incentives from licensee to licensor. Also, the effect is significantly reduced if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology. The effect of the grant-back clause is offset if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology, suggesting that the licensee retains the incentives to invent under these circumstances
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftStrategic Management Journal
    Vol/bind33
    Udgave nummer8
    Sider (fra-til)965–985
    Antal sider21
    ISSN0143-2095
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 2012

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