Judicial Review and Political Partisanship: Moving from Consensual to Majoritarian Democracy

Nuno Garoupaa, Veronica Grembi

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Due to the collapse of the party system during the mid-nineties, Italy represents an interesting case study to test the effects of a transition from a consensual to a majoritarian model of democracy on judicial behavior at the level of the Constitutional Court. Using a dataset of 972 cases of substantive judicial review (ricorsi in via principale) from 1985 to 2005, and proposing new measures of political alignment within constitutional review, we analyze the effect of a change in the political party system on judicial behavior. Our results show that political alignment is a stronger predictor of judicial decision making under majoritarian than consensual model of democracy.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftInternational Review of Law and Economics
Vol/bind43
Sider (fra-til)32-45
Antal sider14
ISSN0144-8188
DOI
StatusUdgivet - aug. 2015

Emneord

  • Party systems
  • Judicial behavior
  • Italian Constitutional Court
  • Judicial politics

Citer dette

@article{f52b919de75944fd988738dbfef794aa,
title = "Judicial Review and Political Partisanship: Moving from Consensual to Majoritarian Democracy",
abstract = "Due to the collapse of the party system during the mid-nineties, Italy represents an interesting case study to test the effects of a transition from a consensual to a majoritarian model of democracy on judicial behavior at the level of the Constitutional Court. Using a dataset of 972 cases of substantive judicial review (ricorsi in via principale) from 1985 to 2005, and proposing new measures of political alignment within constitutional review, we analyze the effect of a change in the political party system on judicial behavior. Our results show that political alignment is a stronger predictor of judicial decision making under majoritarian than consensual model of democracy.",
keywords = "Party systems, Judicial behavior, Italian Constitutional Court, Judicial politics",
author = "Nuno Garoupaa and Veronica Grembi",
year = "2015",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1016/j.irle.2015.04.002",
language = "English",
volume = "43",
pages = "32--45",
journal = "International Review of Law and Economics",
issn = "0144-8188",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

}

Judicial Review and Political Partisanship : Moving from Consensual to Majoritarian Democracy. / Garoupaa, Nuno; Grembi, Veronica .

I: International Review of Law and Economics, Bind 43, 08.2015, s. 32-45.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Judicial Review and Political Partisanship

T2 - Moving from Consensual to Majoritarian Democracy

AU - Garoupaa, Nuno

AU - Grembi, Veronica

PY - 2015/8

Y1 - 2015/8

N2 - Due to the collapse of the party system during the mid-nineties, Italy represents an interesting case study to test the effects of a transition from a consensual to a majoritarian model of democracy on judicial behavior at the level of the Constitutional Court. Using a dataset of 972 cases of substantive judicial review (ricorsi in via principale) from 1985 to 2005, and proposing new measures of political alignment within constitutional review, we analyze the effect of a change in the political party system on judicial behavior. Our results show that political alignment is a stronger predictor of judicial decision making under majoritarian than consensual model of democracy.

AB - Due to the collapse of the party system during the mid-nineties, Italy represents an interesting case study to test the effects of a transition from a consensual to a majoritarian model of democracy on judicial behavior at the level of the Constitutional Court. Using a dataset of 972 cases of substantive judicial review (ricorsi in via principale) from 1985 to 2005, and proposing new measures of political alignment within constitutional review, we analyze the effect of a change in the political party system on judicial behavior. Our results show that political alignment is a stronger predictor of judicial decision making under majoritarian than consensual model of democracy.

KW - Party systems

KW - Judicial behavior

KW - Italian Constitutional Court

KW - Judicial politics

UR - http://sfx-45cbs.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/45cbs?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rfr_id=info:sid/sfxit.com:azlist&sfx.ignore_date_threshold=1&rft.object_id=954921370620&rft.object_portfolio_id=&svc.holdings=yes&svc.fulltext=yes

U2 - 10.1016/j.irle.2015.04.002

DO - 10.1016/j.irle.2015.04.002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 43

SP - 32

EP - 45

JO - International Review of Law and Economics

JF - International Review of Law and Economics

SN - 0144-8188

ER -