Iterated Weak Dominance and Subgame Dominance

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Abstrakt

In this paper, we consider finite normal form games satisfying transference of decisionmaker indifference. We show that any set of strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies can be reduced to a set of strategies equivalent to the set of strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of all weakly dominated strategies in every round by (at most k) further rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. The result develops work by Gretlein [Gretlein, R., 1983. Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games. International Journal of Game Theory 12, 107–113]. We then consider applications and demonstrate how we may obtain a unified approach to the work by Gretlein and recent results by Ewerhart [Ewerhart, C., 2002. Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 107, 474-482] and Marx and Swinkels [Marx, L.M., Swinkels, J.M., 1997. Order independence for iterated weak dominance. Games and Economic Behavior 18, 219-245].
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Mathematical Economics
Vol/bind41
Udgave nummer6
Sider (fra-til)637–645
ISSN0304-4068
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2005
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Weak dominance
  • Weak subgame dominance

Citationsformater