Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections

Paul E. Fischer, Jeffrey D. Gramlich, Brian P. Miller, Hal D. White

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

This paper provides evidence that uncontested director elections provide informative polls of investor perceptions regarding board performance. We find that higher (lower) vote approval is associated with lower (higher) stock price reactions to subsequent announcements of management turnovers. In addition, firms with low vote approval are more likely to experience CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO compensation, fewer and better-received acquisitions, and more and better-received divestitures in the future. These findings hold after controlling for other variables reflecting or determining investor perceptions, suggesting that elections not only inform as a summary statistic, but incrementally inform as well.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Accounting and Economics
Vol/bind48
Udgave nummer2-3
Sider (fra-til)172-189
Antal sider18
ISSN0165-4101
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2009

Emneord

  • Performance measurement
  • Corporate governance
  • Corporate democracy
  • Director elections

Citationsformater