Interlocking Directorates and Collusion: An Empirical Analysis

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    Resumé

    Although several works have suggested that interlocking directorates are mechanisms that have the potential to facilitate collusion, few studies have investigated the matter empirically, and none have systematically considered known cartel cases. Taking a European perspective, and focusing on four different time periods, the present work investigates the extent to which companies that are directly and indirectly connected via interlocking directorships simultaneously or subsequently collude. Utilizing network analysis software the study provides a new method for identifying the two forms of business ties and possible overlaps between them. The analysis is based on an original dataset of European Community cartel cases and data on interlocking directorates developed by others. Very few examples are found of colluding companies that were previously directly or indirectly connected via interlocking directorates. This finding suggests that interlocking directorates rarely facilitate collusive activities.
    Although several works have suggested that interlocking directorates are mechanisms that have the potential to facilitate collusion, few studies have investigated the matter empirically, and none have systematically considered known cartel cases. Taking a European perspective, and focusing on four different time periods, the present work investigates the extent to which companies that are directly and indirectly connected via interlocking directorships simultaneously or subsequently collude. Utilizing network analysis software the study provides a new method for identifying the two forms of business ties and possible overlaps between them. The analysis is based on an original dataset of European Community cartel cases and data on interlocking directorates developed by others. Very few examples are found of colluding companies that were previously directly or indirectly connected via interlocking directorates. This finding suggests that interlocking directorates rarely facilitate collusive activities.
    SprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftInternational Sociology
    Vol/bind29
    Udgave nummer3
    Sider249-267
    ISSN0268-5809
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 2014

    Emneord

    • Cartel cases
    • Collusion
    • European Commission
    • Interlocking directorates
    • Social network analysis

    Citer dette

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    Interlocking Directorates and Collusion : An Empirical Analysis. / Buch-Hansen, Hubert.

    I: International Sociology, Bind 29, Nr. 3, 2014, s. 249-267.

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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