Resumé
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Journal of Management Accounting Research |
| Vol/bind | 31 |
| Udgave nummer | 3 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 201-228 |
| Antal sider | 28 |
| ISSN | 1049-2127 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - jan. 2019 |
Emneord
- Corporate acquisitions
- Valuation
- Information availability
- Rival bidders
- Prior relations
Citer dette
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Information Availability in Acquisition Decisions : The Role of Prior Relations and Rival Bidders. / Smeulders, Dieter; Dekker, Henri C.; Van den Abbeele, Alexandra.
I: Journal of Management Accounting Research, Bind 31, Nr. 3, 01.2019, s. 201-228.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Information Availability in Acquisition Decisions
T2 - The Role of Prior Relations and Rival Bidders
AU - Smeulders, Dieter
AU - Dekker, Henri C.
AU - Van den Abbeele, Alexandra
PY - 2019/1
Y1 - 2019/1
N2 - This study uses detailed survey data from key decision makers in acquiring firms to test the impact of information availability in corporate acquisitions on pre-acquisition valuation and post-acquisition performance. Our results provide support for the hypothesis that information constraints at the time of target valuation are associated with greater overpayment and weaker post-acquisition performance. Prior ties between firms are found to reduce information constraints to acquiring managers, and thereby reduce overpayment and increase post-acquisition performance. Bids by other potential acquirers are found to signal their private information about the target, providing a substitute for lacking information. This effect holds particularly for non-financial data, which are harder to obtain. These findings suggest that overpayment and underperformance can be prevented not only when an acquirer possesses more information, but also when in the absence of needed information, the presence of rival bidders signals their private information about the value of the target.
AB - This study uses detailed survey data from key decision makers in acquiring firms to test the impact of information availability in corporate acquisitions on pre-acquisition valuation and post-acquisition performance. Our results provide support for the hypothesis that information constraints at the time of target valuation are associated with greater overpayment and weaker post-acquisition performance. Prior ties between firms are found to reduce information constraints to acquiring managers, and thereby reduce overpayment and increase post-acquisition performance. Bids by other potential acquirers are found to signal their private information about the target, providing a substitute for lacking information. This effect holds particularly for non-financial data, which are harder to obtain. These findings suggest that overpayment and underperformance can be prevented not only when an acquirer possesses more information, but also when in the absence of needed information, the presence of rival bidders signals their private information about the value of the target.
KW - Corporate acquisitions
KW - Valuation
KW - Information availability
KW - Rival bidders
KW - Prior relations
KW - Corporate acquisitions
KW - Valuation
KW - Information availability
KW - Rival bidders
KW - Prior relations
UR - https://sfx-45cbs.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/45cbs?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rfr_id=info:sid/sfxit.com:azlist&sfx.ignore_date_threshold=1&rft.object_id=963018236053&rft.object_portfolio_id=&svc.holdings=yes&svc.fulltext=yes
U2 - 10.2308/jmar-52302
DO - 10.2308/jmar-52302
M3 - Journal article
VL - 31
SP - 201
EP - 228
JO - Journal of Management Accounting Research
JF - Journal of Management Accounting Research
SN - 1049-2127
IS - 3
ER -