Incentives for Quality over Time: The Case of Facebook Applications

Jörg Claussen, Tobias Kretschmer, Philip Mayrhofer

    Publikation: Working paperForskning


    We study the market for applications on Facebook, the dominant platform for social networking and make use of a rule change by Facebook by which high-quality applications were rewarded with further opportunities to engage users. We find that the change led to quality being a more important driver of usage while sheer network size became less important. Further, we find that update frequency helps applications maintain higher usage, while generally usage of Facebook applications declines less rapidly with age.
    UdgiverThe London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE
    Antal sider29
    StatusUdgivet - 2012
    NavnCEP Discussion Paper


    • Usage intensity
    • Social media
    • Platform management
    • Two-sided markets